Den som vill utöva stor makt bör verka utan att synas - det är en
av grundbuoltarna i CIA:s verksamhet. Nyligen såg vi ett exempel på CIA:s
oerhörda makt i störtandet av Haitis folkvalde president Aristide som rapporterats
utförligt på denna websida. CIA arbetade i största hemlighet med exilhaitiska
krafter från militärdiktaturens dagar (f d militärer och medlemmar i paramilitära
dödsskvadroner) i grannlandet Dominikanska republiken. Dessa tränades och utrustades
av CIA och uppbar med all sannolikhet finansiellt stöd från såväl CIA som medlemmar
i reaktionära kretsar inom Haitis affärselit (det senare har medgivits av
trefaldige kuppmakaren och nuvarande självutnämnde arméchefen Guy Philippe).
Samtidigt som denna militära operation utfördes under stort hyrs-hyrs arbetade
USA och EU helt öppet med en sk civil och fredlig opposition i Haiti som gjorde
sitt yttersta för att skapa kaos genom att förtala regeringen, stödja ekonomiska
sanktioner mot Aristides regering, delta i våldsamma provokationer som stenkastning,
avvikande från överskomna router för demonstrationer osv.
Detta senare helt öppna arbete skulle skapa fiktionen av att det rörde sig om
någon form av legitim protest mot en illegitim regering, men den hemliga
verksamheten och den öppna var i själva verket två sidor av samma mynt: Ett försök
från antidemokratiska sektorer inom Haitis elit och dess sympatisörer inom USA:s
och EU:s elit att med våld störta en demokratiskt vald regering.
Här nedan följer ett utdrag ur Fletchers bok som ger en intressant inblick i
förspelet till den sk Grisbuktsinvasionen:
A Cuban reported to another Cuban who was in touch with a
CIA contact man in Miami that be had friends back in Cuba who were willing
to blow up a major sugar refinery, but they had no munitions or other
equipment necessary to do this. The CIA Cuban reported this to his
contact. A meeting was arranged right away in a "safe"
house -- for example, in the Latin American Geological Survey offices
somewhere on the campus of the University of Miami. The first
Cuban showed on a map where his friends were and explained what
they planned to do. The CIA contact man proposed that the first
thing to do would be to establish contact with them and then to
place a clandestine radio with them. To test the zeal and veracity
of the informant, it was suggested that this be done by putting him
ashore at night near the target. He agreed, on the assurance that he
would be picked up the next night. He was taught how to use the
clandestine radio and was provided with a special kit of munitions.
He was put over the beach and directed to bring one Cuban out with
him for further training. All went well to that point. At no time in
this almost automatic-response process did anyone in the CIA ask,
"Why are we doing this?" The simple Pavlovian
animal-instinct to go ahead and do it because it was an
anti-Castro move was all the agents needed at this stage of activity.
But this is where it always starts. Of course, the ST members
would have right on their side in their almost religious missionary
zeal to do good. The first agent would not only have heard that the
Cubans planned to blow up the sugar refinery; but they would have
flavored this with ideas of the injustice there and with accounts of
the brutality of Castro's police. And they would have pledged that the
reason they wanted to kill Castro was that they want to bring democracy to
their homeland and to all Cuban people.
The "fun and games' must always be founded upon
sanctimonious grounds. At the same time lip service is paid
to do-gooder causes, there is scarcely ever any practical
consideration of whether or not such an action, or those
that will follow whether the initial action succeeds or fails,
are really in the best interests of the United States.
The exfiltrated Cuban was given rudimentary demolition
training at a remote site in Florida and was taught to use signal
lights and panels, as well as the radio. Less than a week later,
he was back in Cuba at work with his neighbors in the sugar
refinery gang.
Although everything seemed to have gone well,
these inexperienced though patriotic Cubans had no
understanding of the Castro operated, Communist-perfected
block system that was in effect in Cuba and that blanketed the entire
island. No one in the CIA had warned them about this, if the thought had
ever crossed their minds. As soon as the first Cuban had been exfiltrated,
his absence was duly noted by the "system". He had not appeared for
work at the refinery, but not a word was said there. A teacher at school was
tipped off to make a discreet inquiry of the man's child: "
Could your father come to school to see your pretty drawings?" "
Well no, teacher, you see my father is not feeling well. He's sick."
Then a state medical technician stopped by his home and asked to see the
father "because it has been reported he is sick". The mother explained
that he was not really sick; it was his uncle in Santiago who was sick,
and he had gone to see the uncle. So the net was drawn tighter. Even before
he had been returned to Cuba, a Castro agent had been infiltrated into the
refinery work crew, and by the time the patriot returned, Castro's men were
ready. They waited, alert. They listened to all of the plans. Perhaps they
joined in encouraging the plans.
Then, on the night of the raid on the refinery everything went
wrong. The whole cabal had been rounded up, and in no more time than it
took for the radio operator to flash an emergency signal to Miami, it
was all over. The reaction to the first information input by that first
CIA agent had doomed those men to death, and their families and friends
to lives of misery. Castro's control, rather than being weakened, had been
strengthened by the brutal elimination of a few more men of blind courage
and the example of that same fate for others who might wish to conspire with
the Yankees.
In this example, which is a true case, if the attack had been
successful, what good would it have done? Do such random bits of vandalism
and sabotage actually further the foreign policy goals of the United States?
Is this kind of anti-Castroism really pro-American? The very little harm to
Castro and his Government, if any, that might possibly have been done, could
not conceivably generate enough benefit to the United States ever to
compensate for the loss this country suffers when such activities fail, as
they so often do. This brings to mind the prophetic words from the Rubáiyát
of Omar Khayyam,
"I wonder often what the Vintners buy One half so precious as the
stuff they sell."
Nevertheless, the ST takes even such
a gross failure as a challenge. They interpret it as some sort of
Castroite dare, and they leap into action again to gamble with other
men's lives. In Miami and in Washington the failure of this first raid
was only the beginning. Word was flashed to CIA that a Castro attack
had wiped out an anti-Communist underground cell. Instead of leaving the
blown operation at that, the CIA readied the next step. No mention was made
of how the initial contact was begun nor of the agent-assisted first attempt,
which was the provocation to Castro. Instead, it was made to look as
though Castro's attack upon the people was entirely unprovoked except by
their anti-Communism.
As the next level of reaction, the CIA suggested an attack
over the beach against that sugar refinery in reprisal for Castro's
so-called "brutal attack upon the anti-Communist Cubans".
It
would be added as part of the "line" that one of the reasons for
this next attack would be to show "the Cuban people that the United
States was right behind them"
Om man jämför ovanstående beskrivning av en misslyckad CIA-operation med
den nu aktuella framgångsrika operationen mot demokratin i Haiti så slås man
främst av hur lite som förändrats sedan det kalla krigets dagar men också
av ett fåtal skillnader. Den främsta skillnaden är att väldigt mycket som
tidigare sköttes i hemlighet av CIA som finansiering av politiska rörerelser
i andra länder nu görs helt öppet av halvstatliga USA-organisationer som
IRI (International Republican Institute) och NED (National Endowment for
Democracy). En annan skillnad är att man numera lägger något större vikt
vid att åtminstone försöka skapa ett sken av konstitutionell legalitet
när man störtar en demokratiskt vald regering. Innan USA lät kidnappa Aristide
tvingade man honom därför att skriva på någon form av avskedsansökan och den nye
premiärministern som valts av ett råd på sju personer framställs som
någon form av konstitutionell ledare.
Men likheterna är mera slående: Den ideologiska fanatismen (Aristide lät bygga
massor av skolor åt de fattiga, alltså måste han vara vänster vilket givetvis är
samma sak som kommunist), våldskulten (den som har bättre vapen har självklart
rätt att mörda poliser och öppna fängelser för att skapa så mycket kaos som
möjligt i ett demokratiskt land, det finns "goda" terrorister precis
som det finns onda terrorister) samt slutligen ett uppenbart mått av irrationalitet:
I det kubanska fallet ägnade man inte en tanke på om sprängandet av ett sockerbruk
skulle gynna långsiktiga amerikanska intressen, i det haitiska fallet var det
fullkomligt irrelevant om långsiktiga amerikanska intressen gynnas av att de mest
hänsynslösa sektorerna inom Haitis elit än en gång får lära sig att det bara
är att be Uncle Sam om en hjälpande hand så fort man är lite missnöjd med en
demokratiskt vald regering som är ofin nog att försöka inbjuda affärseliten
att delta i byggandet av någon form av organiserat samhälle där även de 80 procent
av befolkningen som är fattiga får tillgång till lite utbildning och hälsovård.
